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Hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic
Weimar Republic hyperinflation from one to one
trillion paper Marks per gold Mark
A 50,000,000 (50 million) mark banknote from
1923
A 1000 Mark banknote, over-stamped in red with
"Eine Milliarde Mark" long scale (1,000,000,000
mark), issued in Germany during the
hyperinflation of 1923
The hyperinflation in the Weimar Republic was a three-year period
of hyperinflation in Germany (the Weimar Republic) between June
1921 and July 1924.
Analysis
The hyperinflation episode in the Weimar Republic in the 1920s was
not the first hyperinflation, nor was it the only one in early 1920s
Europe or even the most extreme inflation in history (the Hungarian
pengő and Zimbabwean dollar have both been more inflated).
However, as the most prominent case following the emergence of
economics as a scholarly discipline, it drew interest in a way that
previous instances had not. Many of the dramatic and unusual
economic behaviors now associated with hyperinflation were first
documented systematically in Germany: order-of-magnitude increases
in prices and interest rates, redenomination of the currency, consumer
flight from cash to hard assets, and the rapid expansion of industries
that produced those assets. German monetary economics was then
highly influenced by Chartalism and the German Historical School,
and this conditioned the way the hyperinflation was then usually
analyzed.[1]
John Maynard Keynes described the situation in The Economic
Consequences of the Peace: "The inflationism of the currency systems
of Europe has proceeded to extraordinary lengths. The various
belligerent Governments, unable, or too timid or too short-sighted to
secure from loans or taxes the resources they required, have printed
notes for the balance."
It was during this period of hyperinflation that French and British
economic experts began to claim that Germany destroyed its economy
with the purpose of avoiding reparations, but both governments had
conflicting views on how to handle the situation. The French declared
that Germany should keep paying reparations, while Britain sought to
grant a moratorium that would allow for its financial reconstruction.[2]
Although reparations accounted for about one third of the German
deficit from 1920 to 1923,[3] the government found reparations a
convenient scapegoat. Other scapegoats included bankers and
speculators (particularly foreign). The inflation reached its peak by
November 1923 but ended when a new currency (the Rentenmark) was
introduced. In order to make way for the new currency, banks "turned
the marks over to junk dealers by the ton"[4] to be recycled as paper.
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Postage stamps of Weimar Germany during the
hyperinflation period of early 1920s
A medal commemorating Germany's 1923
hyperinflation. The engraving reads: "On 1st
November 1923 1 pound of bread cost 3 billion, 1
pound of meat: 36 billion, 1 glass of beer: 4
billion."
Outcome
Although the inflation ended with the introduction of the Rentenmark
and the Weimar Republic continued for a decade afterwards,
hyperinflation is widely believed to have contributed to the Nazi
takeover of Germany and Adolf Hitler's rise to power. Adolf Hitler
himself in his book, Mein Kampf, makes many references to the
German debt and the negative consequences that brought about the
inevitability of "National Socialism". The inflation also raised doubts
about the competence of liberal institutions, especially amongst a
middle class who had held cash savings and bonds. It also produced
resentment of bankers and speculators, whom the government and the
press blamed for the inflation crisis.[5] Many of them were Jews, and
some Germans called the hyperinflated Weimar banknotes Jew
Confetti.[6]
Later German monetary policy showed far greater concern for
maintaining a sound currency, a concern that even affected Germany's
attitude in resolving the European sovereign debt crisis from 2009
onwards.[7]
The hyperinflated, worthless Marks became widely collected abroad.
The Los Angeles Times estimated in 1924 that more of the
decommissioned notes were spread about the United States than
existed in Germany.[4]
Nevertheless the immense acceleration process that occurs during the
German hyperinflation of 1922/23 still remains unclear and
unpredictable. The transformation of an inflationary development into
the hyperinflation has to be identified as a very complex phenomenon,
which could be a further advanced research avenue of the complexity




In order to pay the large costs of World War I, Germany suspended the convertibility of its currency into gold when
that war broke out. Unlike France, which imposed its first income tax to pay for the war, the German Kaiser and
Parliament decided without opposition to fund the war entirely by borrowing,[9] a decision criticised by financial
experts like Hjalmar Schacht even before hyperinflation broke out.[10] The result was that the exchange rate of the
Mark against the US dollar fell steadily throughout the war to 8.91 Marks per dollar. The Treaty of Versailles,
however, accelerated the decline in the value of the Mark, so that by the end of 1919 more than 47 paper Marks were
required to buy one US dollar.[11] It is sometimes argued that Germany had to inflate its currency to pay the war
reparations required under the Treaty of Versailles, but this is misleading, because the Reparations Commission
required payment to be in gold marks or in foreign currency, not in the rapidly depreciating paper mark.[12][13]
The German currency was relatively stable at about 60 Marks per US Dollar during the first half of 1921.[14] 
Because the Western theatre of World War I was mostly in France and Belgium, Germany had come out of the war
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with most of its industrial power intact, a healthy economy, and arguably in a better position to once again become a
dominant force in the European continent than its neighbours.[2] But the "London ultimatum" in May 1921
demanded reparations in gold or foreign currency to be paid in annual installments of 2,000,000,000 (2 billion)
goldmarks plus 26 percent of the value of Germany's exports.
The first payment was paid when due in June 1921.[15] That was the beginning of an increasingly rapid devaluation
of the Mark which fell to less than one third of a cent by November 1921 (approx. 330 Marks per US Dollar). The
total reparations demanded was 132,000,000,000 (132 billion) goldmarks which was far more than the total German
gold and foreign exchange.
Hyperinflation
Beginning in August 1921, Germany began to buy foreign currency with Marks at any price, but that only increased
the speed of breakdown in the value of the Mark.[16] The lower the mark sank in international markets, the greater
the amount of marks were required to buy the foreign currency demanded by the Reparations Commission.[13]
Germany, 1923: banknotes had lost so much
value that they were used as wallpaper
During the first half of 1922, the Mark stabilized at about 320 Marks
per Dollar. This was accompanied by international reparations
conferences, including one in June 1922 organized by U.S. investment
banker J. P. Morgan, Jr.[17] When these meetings produced no
workable solution, the inflation changed to hyperinflation and the
Mark fell to 8000 Marks per Dollar by December 1922. The cost of
living index was 41 in June 1922 and 685 in December, an increase of
more than 16 times.
In January 1923 French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr, the
industrial region of Germany in the Ruhr valley to ensure that the
reparations were paid in goods, such as coal from the Ruhr and other
industrial zones of Germany, because the Mark was practically
worthless. Inflation was exacerbated when workers in the Ruhr went
on a general strike, and the German government printed more money
in order to continue paying them for "passively resisting."[18] As a
result of hyperinflation, there were news accounts of individuals in
Germany suffering from a compulsion called zero stroke, a condition
where the person has a "desire to write endless rows of [zeros] and
engage in computations more involved than the most difficult problems in logarithms."[19]
Stabilization
Two Rentenmark (Issued according Decree of
15th of October 1923, RGBL I S.963)
When the new currency, the Rentenmark, replaced the worthless
Reichsbank marks on November 16, 1923 and 12 zeros were cut from
prices, prices in the new currency remained stable. The German people
regarded this stable currency as a miracle[20] because they had heard
such claims of stability before with the Notgeld (emergency money)
that rapidly devalued as an additional source of inflation.[21] The usual
explanation was that the Rentenmarks were issued in a fixed amount
and were backed by hard assets such as agricultural land and industrial
assets, but what happened was more complex than that, as summarized
in the following description.
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In August 1923, Karl Helfferich proposed a plan to issue a new currency (roggenmark) backed by mortgage bonds
indexed to market prices (in paper Marks) of rye grain. His plan was rejected because of the greatly fluctuating price
of rye in paper Marks. The Agriculture Minister Hans Luther proposed a different plan which substituted gold for rye
and a new currency, the Rentenmark, backed by bonds indexed to market prices (in paper Marks) of gold.[22]
The gold bonds were defined at the rate of 2,790 gold Marks per kilogram of gold, which was the same definition as
the pre-war goldmarks. The rentenmarks were not redeemable in gold, but were only indexed to the gold bonds. This
rentenmark plan was adopted in monetary reform decrees on October 13–15, 1923 that set up a new bank, the
Rentenbank controlled by Hans Luther who had become the new Finance Minister.
After November 12, 1923, when Hjalmar Schacht became currency commissioner, the Reichsbank, the old central
bank, was not allowed to discount any further government Treasury bills, which meant the corresponding issue of
paper marks also ceased.[23] Discounting of commercial trade bills was allowed and the amount of Rentenmarks
expanded, but the issue was strictly controlled to conform to current commercial and government transactions. The
new Rentenbank refused credit to the government and to speculators who were not able to borrow Rentenmarks,
because Rentenmarks were not legal tender.[24] When Reichsbank president Rudolf Havenstein died on November
20, 1923, Schacht was appointed president of the Reichsbank. By November 30, 1923, there were 500 million
Rentenmarks in circulation, which increased to 1000 million by January 1, 1924, and again to 1,800 million
Rentenmarks by July 1924. Meanwhile, the old paper Marks continued in circulation. The total paper Marks
increased to 1,211 quintillion in July 1924 and continued to fall in value to one third of their conversion value in
Rentenmarks.[24]
The monetary law of August 30, 1924 permitted exchange of each old paper 1,000,000,000,000 Mark note for one
new Reichsmark, equivalent in value to one Rentenmark.
Revaluation
Conversion Table (Revaluation Act 1925)
Eventually, some debts were reinstated to partially compensate those
who had been creditors. A decree of 1925 reinstated some mortgages at
25% of face value in the new Reichsmark (effectively 25,000,000,000
times their value in old marks) if they had been held 5 years or more.
Similarly some government bonds were reinstated at 2-1/2% of face -
to be paid after reparations were paid.[25] Mortgage debt was reinstated
at much higher percentages than government bonds. Reinstatement of
some debts, combined with a resumption of effective taxation in a
still-devastated economy, triggered a wave of corporate bankruptcies.
One of the important issues of the stabilization of a hyperinflation is
the revaluation. In its customary sense it refers to the raising of the
exchange rate of one national currency against other currencies. It also
means revalorization – the restoration of the value of a currency
depreciated by inflation. The German government had the choice either by means of a revaluation law to finish the
hyperinflation quickly or to allow sprawling and the political and violent disturbances on the streets. The German
Government argued in detail that the interests of creditors and debtors had to be fair and balanced. Neither the living
standard price index nor the share price index or the property price index (for this time, however, not existing) were
judged as relevant. The calculation of the conversion relation was considerably judged to the dollar index as well as
to the wholesale price index. In principle the German government followed the line of market orientated reasoning
that the dollar index and the wholesale price index would roughly indicate the true price level in general over the
period of high inflation and hyperinflation. In addition the revaluation was bound on the exchange rate Mark and
North American Dollar, based on the Berlin Bourse to obtain the value of the Goldmark.[26]
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The Law about the Revaluation of Mortgages and other Claims (Revaluation Act 1925 of 16 July 1925) finally
included only the relation of paper mark to gold mark for the period from 1 January 1918 to 30 November 1923 and
the following days.[27] This led to the fact which was given up the A Mark is worth a Mark principle recognized till
then (nominal value principle) because of the galloping inflation.[28] This law was challenged in the Supreme Court
of the German Reich (Reichsgericht). The 5th Senate of the German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) ruled on 4
November 1925 that the Revaluation Act 1925 was constitutional, even when weighed against the "Bill of Rights
and Duties of Germans" (articles 109, 134, 152, and 153 of the Constitution).[29][30][31] This case was
precedence-setting for the issue of judicial review in German jurisprudence.[32]
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